Why Racists Lose Wars

On February 21st, 2025, General CQ Brown was removed from his position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary of Defense Hegseth had advocated for Brown’s removal several times before. In his 2024 book about DEI in the military, The War on Warriors: Behind the Betrayal of the Men Who Keep Us Free, Hegseth specifically cited Brown’s blackness as a reason he should not be in command.¹ Nor was this a one-off: other high-profile military commanders who were not white men were fired at the same time to be replaced with white men.²

Most observers, approvingly or critically, viewed this as an act of white supremacy: a change to make it so a white man need never take an order from a black man.³ Viewed as a piece of American history, this is dire: overt erosion of decades of civil rights victories, a slide into a grimmer, narrower life for Americans. Viewed as a piece of world history – not American exceptionalism, but an echo of similar policies in other countries – it is worse.

Such social reforms, where a country looks at its existing ethnic hierarchy and makes it more inegalitarian, are historically common, especially after invasions or revolutions. To do so after a peaceful transfer of power is less common, mostly for the reason that it’s stupid. Rulers often, individually and in the short term, can profit from higher degrees of ethnic inequality, as it allows them to pit internal groups against each other. This is a problem because it is pitting internal groups against each other, spending resources on infighting, insurgency, and civil wars that could be spent on food, giant statues, and non-civil wars. Lower inequalities are, in fact, profound boons to the societies able to secure them, and though this result is difficult to quantify, difficult is not impossible.

Quantification of these catastrophes is the subject of Jason Lyall’s Divided Armies, a terrifying work on the relationship between ethnic inequality and military failure. Lyall’s work has a lengthy, demanding technical section (which we will have to visit briefly in order to make any sense of the rest of the work) and then dives deep into case studies of countries whose bigotry turned to military failure and eventually total national disaster.

Divided Armies is, among other things, a warning about the disaster that would result from reorganizing the US military into a divided ethnocracy. Reactionary reformers in the US government are clearly aware of this, because they pressured the National Defense University’s Joint Forces Quarterly to remove a positive review of Divided Armies from their website.⁴ Fortunately, I was able to secure a copy of the review,⁵ which is glowing: “original and compelling,” “inviting and challenging,” “meticulous,” and of course praise that is almost certain to fall on deaf ears today: “Lyall has convincingly demonstrated that the most successful armies will not only be diverse, but they will also embrace diversity as strength and use that strength to repel and defeat armies unable to overcome their own inequalities.”

“United We Win,” Photograph by Alexander Liberman, 1943, Printed by the Government, Printing Office for the War Manpower Commission, Records of the Office of Government Reports (NAID: 513820). Unrestricted Usage.

Make no mistake: to the extent that the Trump administration’s plans would weaken the US military, it is not in a way that should make any anti-imperialist or anti-war activist feel comfortable. In his bizarre saber-rattling around Greenland and Canada, Trump proposes the expansion of US intervention abroad; my pessimism is that his cronies’ military reforms will make things more bloody and brutal on all fronts. Countries with weak militaries do not refrain from violence; they just commit violence more bluntly and haphazardly. Several countries gambled and lost their entire existence on militaries that were weak in exactly this way – not underfunded or underequipped, but divided against themselves, and against their own civilian populations.

Lyall’s technique

To summarize extremely briefly the core of Lyall’s work, he defines two aggregate terms and then checks their correlation. He does so across a staggeringly large database, with 825 belligerent observations across 250 wars.⁶

The first term was “military inequality coefficient,” hereafter ‘inequality,’ which is a measure of the citizenship status of the members of a military. If a person is facing no state-sanctioned discrimination, they are a 0; if they are a member of a community that is facing state-sanctioned discrimination, they score a 0.5; if they suffer collective repression, that is a 1; and the military inequality coefficient is the average of all the soldiers’ scores in the military.⁷ This is an ethnic question: Lyall is not measuring economic inequality, nor inequality along gendered lines, nor more specific forms of political access.⁸ This is simultaneously coarse, only having 3 levels of measurement, and narrow, measuring only one form of inequality. This is necessary for looking for correlations across such a large data set.

The second term is “battlefield performance index.” It starts at 1, and then loses 0.25 points for each of the following:

1. Below Parity Loss Exchange Ratio (defined as: suffered more dead than they inflicted in combat)

2. Mass desertion (defined as: greater than 10% of the entire force deserted)

3. Mass defection (defined as: greater than 10% of the entire force defected)

4. Blocking detachments (defined as: the military dedicated full, detached combat units to the task of using their weapons to keep other units in combat)

This is worth paying attention to, as, except for point 1, these are not things that a basic grounding in history trains you to look out for. Losing 10% of a deployed force to desertion is devastating on a level Americans may struggle to comprehend; losing 10% of your deployed force to them defecting – to them leaving your army to join the opposition – is nearly incomprehensible. To people used to thinking about the US military, these three sound near impossible. I bring this up to highlight that however little you may think of the US military, it has enormous room to get worse.

The Double V campaign was was a national effort to advocate for African American rights during World War II. The campaign promoted the idea of a “double victory”: one abroad against fascism and the Axis powers, and one at home against racism and discrimination, through participation in the war effort. Image: “V” home campaign, Washington, DC, 10/1942,” created October 1942, by The Office for Emergency Management. Office of Civilian Defense. Public Counsel Division. (1942 – 06/30/1944). Unrestricted Usage.

Lyall discusses several ways the data could have broken: hypothetically, higher inequality armies could be more decisive, more experimental, more orderly.⁹However, the data is unambiguous and harsh: more unequal armies are more incompetent. An army that is divided against itself struggles with communication, coordination, and control, which in turn limits its options to simpler, bloodier tactics and increases the likelihood of off-battlefield discipline challenges ranging from violence against civilians to desertion and defection.¹⁰ A divided army winds up fighting a war against itself.

Members of an artillery unit stand by and check their equipment while the convoy takes a break. The photograph shows African American artillery troops on the march in Belgium, 1944. Image by the U.S. Signal Corps.

The ways that armies have tried to compensate for the decline in trust, command, and control are fascinating and show incredible intellectual effort on the part of military commanders to meet their moment. Some of these compensations are physical: restricting pay and even access to equipment until the last minute. Many of them are informational: not giving soldiers good and accurate information about battlefield conditions, plans, and especially terrain. Most frequently they are organizational: putting ethnic minorities under the exclusive command of favored ethnic officers, some armies try to break up ethnic minorities and spread them across other units so they cannot conspire together for desertions while others (and sometimes even the same ones at different moments!) will attempt to create ethnically segregated units so that they know where their least reliable and most expendable soldiers are. Ethnic minorities may be placed in high risk frontline duties, like infantry screening far forward of tanks,¹¹ or they may be restricted from any combat duties in order to prevent them from surrendering, deserting, defecting, or otherwise damaging military operations.¹² Armies have tried longer marches and shorter marches, they’ve had units march or even fight in tight columns for longer periods so that military police can more closely monitor suspect troops, they’ve had advanced monitoring programs and baroque collective punishment regimes and bribes and appeals to shared identity and more sociological experiments than most of us will be exposed to in a lifetime. None of these are what I would call “successful” – they are, optimistically, expenses that armies pay in time and manpower and efficiency, an interest bearing bill for bigotry.

Kokand

At 2 a.m. on June 14th, 1865, a force of fewer than 2,000 Russians under the command of M.G. Cherniaev disobeyed orders from the Czar and assaulted the fortified city of Tashkent, the capital of the Khanate of Kokand, the premier power in Central Asia at that time. The storming of the city moved incredibly quickly, with a formal surrender on June 17th and only 25 Russians killed in action, compared to upwards of 5,000 Kokandian defenders (out of 30,000 total soldiers who were manning Tashkent’s defenses). Resistance by the Kokandian army was desultory and minimal – the group that fought the Russian army most fiercely was neither the feudal levies nor the professional soldiers, but the city’s desperate, panicked civilians, whose deaths were not even tabulated in records of the battle. The surrender of Tashkent to Russian forces ended the Russo-Kokandian War, with Russia taking over half of Kokand’s territory in 1866, then vassalage in 1868 and annexation in 1876.

Normally, storming a city is extremely difficult, and storming a city whose formal defenders outnumber you fifteen to one is a very reliable way to lose an army. Cherniaev, however, had been fighting with the Kokandian army for some time at this point, and experience had taught him that the Kokandian army was uninterested in fighting. It broke quickly in the face of massed fire or even stern resistance, and was consistently unable to regroup after any form of withdrawal. Even under conditions of urban combat, the army of Kokand aggressively pursued every opportunity to escape any zone of conflict.

This was not due to any technological inferiority: Kokand had similar levels of sophistication to Russia in small arms, in training, in signals, in cavalry – and actually had a substantial advantage in artillery, to the extent that the Russians swore frequently and with some paranoia that Kokand had a detachment of British artillerymen with them.¹³ What the Kokandian army did not have was a Kokand.

The Army of Kokand was a patchwork in multiple ways, having both a professional backbone of approximately 20,000 soldiers and a further 20-30,000 feudal levies who could be added to that total over a longer mobilization. Beyond this bureaucratic distinction, however, Kokand was a messy series of alliances-at-gunpoint between a variety of ethnic groups of varying levels of political cohesion. In the 1860s, Kokand was ruled by one ‘Alimqul,¹⁴ who had risen to power in an 1852 coup.

Despite Islam’s unifying force in the Khanate, ‘Alimqul primarily exercised his hold on power by playing various ethnic factions off against each other, most notably by keeping Uzbek and Kipchack peoples at the top of an ethnic hierarchy.¹⁵This in turn meant repression against Kazakhs, Tajiks, and Karapalooks, with a special place of hatred and violence for the Kirghiz people, who had been aligned with ‘Alimqul’s rivals around the time of his 1852 coup. 25,000 Kirghiz were massacred by ‘Alimqul and his allies in 1853 alone, and while the scale of violence and repression slowed, it never stopped. Which makes this as good a time as any to highlight that about 30% of the Kokand army was Kirghiz. It is not mysterious or any indication of infirmity that, when ‘Alimqul asked his Kirghiz soldiers to risk their lives for his benefit, they defected and deserted by the thousands.

Per Lyall’s measurements, Kokand had a military inequality of 0.7, which he describes as “likely approaching the suggested threshold for maximum inequality.” And as his theory predicted, Kokand’s military operated poorly: units did not regroup after withdrawing. Tactics were limited to frontal charges. Tajik (20% of the army and the primary infantry contribution) and Kirghiz (again, 30%) units were only barely willing to engage and fled if there was any hint that an easy victory was not forthcoming. Kipchak units refused to support Tajik and Kirghiz units, which in turn made it impossible to coordinate any sort of meaningful shock actions. Keeping units in combat eventually involved using more “reliable” units from more privileged ethnicities as blocking detachments to force less privileged ethnic units into the front of fighting. Desertion was rampant, and that infamous loss-exchange ratio proved dismal. The only reason that Kokand does not get a perfect score for total dysfunction is that, because Cherniaev’s opposing army was only a few thousand, he was unwilling to accept more than a thousand or so defectors, artificially capping the potential defection number below Lyall’s own threshold for “mass defection.”

Hence when the war reached its ultimate conclusion at Tashkent, Cherniaev had not only observed firsthand Kokand’s battlefield weaknesses – its disorganized charges and its infighting in the middle of battle between Kirghiz and Kipchak units – but thanks to Kokand’s many defections he had a thorough understanding of Tashkent’s defenses. Normally, assaulting a city at a fifteen-to-one numerical disadvantage is a terrible idea; when you know not just where its defenders are but that they will respond to surprises with total retreat, you are in a position to upend even basic military sense.

How much agency ‘Alimqul had in reversing the ethnic divisions of Kokand is outside the scope of our, or Lyall’s, work. What we know is that his domestic power base was built on exacerbating and heightening ethnic tensions, and that these exacerbations led to slaughters and pogroms off the field, total battlefield collapse on the field, and the total destruction of Kokand as a state. As ever, the brunt of that death and destruction fell not on the authors of Kokand’s ethnic hierarchy but on its victims: they were the ones who were subject to pogroms, then put into the most dangerous battlefield roles, and then wound up the most vulnerable to the depredations inflicted on the losing side of any war.

Austria-Hungary

The Austro-Hungarian Empire’s performance during World War I is generally remembered as poor – an army that struggled with incompetent leadership, constant supply challenges, and basic coordination issues. A major contributing factor in these problems was Austria-Hungary’s ethnic divisions: at the most basic level, individual units could require the use of half a dozen languages just to coordinate internally, but problems were not merely technical issues of communication. Austria-Hungary had significant divisions in their legal system regarding the treatment of different ethnicities, with German-speaking Austrians occupying the clear top of the pyramid and Hungarians, Czechs, and especially Ruthenians, Serbians, and Croats held in increasing degrees of contempt by the governing authorities. Lyall computes their inequality at 0.37, which is in the middle range of the dataset.

The behavior of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a result of these challenges is instructive and chilling. Faced with an army already divided quite heavily against itself, and a nation that perhaps more than any other was positioned badly to handle the preceding decades’ rise of nationalism, the Austro-Hungarian Empire leaned into its ethnic divisions, increasing repression against ethnic minorities as collective punishment for their failure to be members of the ruling ethnicity. Unsurprisingly these punishments were demoralizing, decreasing both the battlefield performance of the affected units and increasing mutinies on the front, which in turn strained Austria-Hungary’s resources for the entire war effort.

These collective punishments did not stop at the civilian-military boundary, and in many ways did not start there. Ruthenians and Serbians were viewed as suspect by dint of their ethnicities, as presumptive loyalists to Russia and Serbia, respectively, and placed under harsher repression. Lyall calculates that, if this shift in treatment after the outbreak of the war is accounted for, the inequality of the Austro-Hungarian “Common Army” jumps from 0.37 to 0.434.

Let us spell out what that mistreatment looked like: by September 1914, Austria-Hungary had executed 25,000 Ruthenians – the war had started on July 28th of that year. Refugees were sorted by ethnicity, and housing and food rations were allotted to more favored ethnicities at the expense of Ruthenians, Jews, and Czechs. Families of all ethnic backgrounds were punished on the homefront for their relatives’ behaviors in the military – and such behaviors were inevitably more scrutinized and viewed more uncharitably against soldiers from the aforementioned ethnic groups.

The opening phase of the war on the Austro-Hungarian vs. Russian front was the Battle of Galicia, an aggressive offensive by Austria-Hungary that sought to defeat the Russian army while it was still mustering. It was a catastrophe for the Austro-Hungarian side: an inability to coordinate artillery with infantry movements, excessively long marches, and over-extension converted early victories into an all-out retreat. The army’s discipline was degraded and found itself led by “war officers” replaced the incredibly depleted prewar officer corps,¹⁶ retreated back through Ruthenian dominated Galicia. Austro-Hungarian soldiers took to massacres against civilians, hanging “priests and peasants alike.” The Supreme Commander of the Austro-Hungarian Forces, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, remarked, “We fight on our own territory as in a hostile land…Everywhere Ruthenes are being executed under martial law.”¹⁷

The Common Army of Austria-Hungary did not start out the war in a strong position. It was undergunned, underequipped, incoherent, and sluggish.¹⁸ Mobilization was impeded by poor train scheduling, a problem that persisted throughout the war and exacted a devastating toll on the civilian population as transportation miscoordination caused local famines. These weaknesses did not stop Austria-Hungary from, more than any other single country on the planet, starting World War I. And these weaknesses enabled, rather than prevented, deprivation and slaughter against the citizenry of their own country.

Mahdiya

It is 1881. The British Army has opponents armies in India, in Persia, in China, in Myanmar, in India, in Japan, in Bhutan, in India – and today it is central Africa’s turn. They have come up the Nile, south, to crush a Sudanese religious uprising that will go down in history as the Mahdist Revolt. The British have experience, training, and above all equipment on their side: modern rifles, artillery swift enough to be used on mountains, and machine guns, weapons of the future that enable a man to fire death hundreds of times a minute without tiring. The Mahdhists have spears and knives; their army has experience measured in minutes, not years, being composed of enthusiastic, spontaneous volunteers rather than blooded veterans. The British are led by one of their great war heroes, Charles “Chinese” Gordon, commander of the Ever Victorious Army, who has defeated forces larger than his own time and time again. The outcome is foregone, never in doubt: the British will lose, Gordon will be decapitated, and the Mahdist state will become independent.

It is 1898. The British Army has crushed armies in India, in Malaysia, in South Africa, in Borneo, in India – and today it is central Africa’s turn.They have come up the Nile, south, to crush an independent Sudanese country that will go down in history as the Mahdiya. The British are experienced, but so are the Mahdiya; the British have artillery, but so do the Mahdiya. Rather than a spontaneous muster of amateur warriors, the Mahdiya has an army of trained soldiers. The outcome is foregone, never in doubt: the Mahdiya will be destroyed, their state extinguished. The decisive action of the war will become a metonym for the overwhelming power disparity between the British and those they colonize.¹⁹

What happened in those seventeen years?

Per Lyall: Mahdist society was substantially reorganized along ethnocratic lines. The founding of the Mahdiya was a rupture: the Mahdi²⁰ worked aggressively to transform his society according to his utopian Islamic vision. He implemented a Quranic legal code, policies designed to level economic distinctions, and a strict dress code that obscured both economic and ethnic distinctions, and he waged a society-wide Jihad against the ‘Turk.”²¹Sudan was ruled by Egypt, which was formally part of The Ottoman Empire, but for Great Power reasons, Britain was the actual colonial military force in Egypt. Yes, this is confusing and awkward.²² The Mahdi’s ability to restructure society was propelled by zeal and sustained by sudden military success–but this was the Mahdi’s vision, not one shared by his successor.

The Mahdi died suddenly and unexpectedly of typhus shortly after the Mahdiya confirmed its independence. His successor, Abdallahi Muhammad (The Khalifa), had a completely different blueprint for social organization – one where his tribe (the Ta’isha sub-tribe of the Baggara, from Darfur) dominated all others. Again, to take a successfully egalitarian project and turn it into a harsh ethnocracy is a bloody, painful, and expensive project. In the Mahdiya’s case, per Dominic Green, it cost upwards of three million lives over ten years, or about half the population of the country.²³ Abdallahi Muhammad launched campaigns of repression against the Ashraf (the tribe the Mahdi was from), Kababish, Amarar, Hadendowa, Juhaina, Ben Husain, Shilluk, Nuer, Ja’alin, Beja, Batahin, Dongola, Berber, and of course Egyptians peoples²⁴ Massacres of the Kababish, a critical camel handling and thus logistically integral tribe, and Juhaina, a primarily agricultural tribe, caused widespread famine, which the Khalifah used as an opportunity to redistribute resources to the Baggara and enact further genocide against non-favored peoples.

Internal violence of this type and scale cannot be kept internal for long. An army used this way will start to lead state policy rather than follow it, and any of the civic structures that could have checked it corrode. Under the Khalifa, the Mahdiya launched wars against Ethiopia, Italian Eritrea, Egypt (again), and Equatoria²⁵ that went hand-in-hand with campaigns of repression and mass execution. When the British finally invaded in 1895, they faced a nation that had isolated itself internationally: not only had the Mahdiya rejected an offer of alliance from neighbouring Ethiopia, but it had gone on to kill its emperor, Yohannes IV, and devastate the northwest of the country.²⁶ By 1895, the British viewed the end of the Mahdiya a “when” rather than an “if,” and were more pressingly concerned about South Sudan becoming a French possession.

That last part is a change: in the 1880s, the Mahdiya was viewed seriously as an independent nation by the British. General Wolseley described it as a “great Military Power,” and Mahdist soldiers were covered by the Geneva convention. It was a country with taxes and money, a judiciary and a navy, a standing army and a telegraph system. It had correspondence with the Ottomans and the British, and delegations were dispatched to Omdurman by India, Tunis, Morocco, Wadai, and Hijaz.²⁷ It was clearly, though likely not uniformly, the perspective of the British that the Mahdiya was a stable, independent state that was to be negotiated with and maneuvered around, rather than a temporary interruption of rightful Anglo-Turkish-Egyptian governance.

The end of the Mahdiya came swiftly. The British expedition that mustered in 1896 was substantially better prepared and less arrogant than in 1881, but the change on the Mahdist side was far more dramatic. The Mahdist army of the 1890s no longer practiced live-fire exercises, fearing that it would serve as cover for a potential revolt. The great enemy of the people of the Mahdi was no longer the Egyptian government or “the Turk” or infidels from outside, but the Khalifa and his co-ethnics. It was an army that sent one of its most able commanders, Abd ar Rahman al-Nujimi, on an unsupported invasion of Egypt that is widely considered to have been a suicide mission designed to get him killed for perceived disloyalty – which is to say, membership in the disfavored Ashraf tribe.²⁸ Trust, loyalty, and command issues degraded functionally every asset the Mahdiya had from their previous war. Multiple tactics that were critical to Mahdist success had to be torn from the playbook – approaches under cover via dried rivers or rolling dunes were unacceptable because they would break line of sight between overseers and soldiers. Similarly, night fighting as a technique, something the British had come to fear profoundly from the Mahdhists of the 1880s, was abandoned because of the ease with which it would enable mass desertion. Ambushes and surprise attacks were passed on, and orderly retreats were discouraged. Soldiers deserted and defected by the thousands before every battle, and even Mahdist commanders like Osman Digna encouraged their own soldiers to desert. The culmination of all these problems was the Battle of Omdurman, where reportedly the Madhiya lost 227 soldiers for each British loss.²⁹

Bringing the War Home

Militaries, especially in industrial societies, are zones of exceptional government control, where the seclusion from normal communities, the reforging of new communal bonds in the barracks, and the soldiers’ surrender of regular civilian freedoms give an officer with a social reformers bent remarkable power to create their ideal society in miniature. Civilians would be fools to shrug off this dynamic as none of their business. Militaries may be products of the societies that make them, but it is not a one way street: civilians frequently look up to and emulate military institutions, and veterans tend to bring lessons from their military life back to their civilian life, whether they served in a Roman legion or a US armored brigade.

The current American right wing movement has promised its adherents a new vision of America: one where a white man is always in a position of authority over each and every black and brown one. A strict, clean ethnocracy where a person’s place in society may be known from the color of their skin. A society that is not just generally and ambiently racist, but rigidly and lawfully racist. They have heard harsh critiques of American injustice and gone, “that sounds like a great idea.” They have, like so many of their predecessors throughout history, started this form of social reform in the military.

U.S. Government poster of Nazis burning books, with quotation by Franklin D. Roosevelt on a large book in the background: “Books cannot be killed by fire. People die, but books never die. No man and no force can put thought in a concentration camp forever. No man and no force can take from the world the books that embody man’s eternal fight against tyranny. In this war, we know, books are weapons.” Poster produced by the United States Office of War Information (OWI) for distribution to libraries and book stores. Created by Broder, S; United States. Office of War Information, 1942. Public Domain.

I write this not to tell you that this is awful on the surface – I trust that my readers are capable of filling in that moral blank on their own – but to spell out the additional downstream costs for such reforms. Bigotry is ultimately an expensive luxury, and its price is paid not only in money and wages and bureaucracy. As we saw with Kokand, Austria-Hungary, and the Mahdiya, ethnocracies create armies that cannot perform normal combat maneuvers, that cannot commit their own forces reliably, that dissolve in the field sometimes without a fight, and that get themselves killed in great numbers. None of that incompetence has any rebounding effect in creating a more peaceful world. The armies of ethnocratic states wage wars of aggression and then participate in massacres against their own civilians for the crime of being already discriminated against. Rigid ethnocracies are not the default, but instead an exercise in violence that, for no greater good than making already privileged people happier, involves fighting a war against your own people even while you are fighting existential wars against invaders.

The changes to the US military over 2025 are not unprecedented; history is long, there are precedents for all sorts of things. The precedents that make the most sense to me, that rhyme most clearly to my ears, are countries that doomed themselves with ethnic division. Hegseth’s reforms will not remain isolated to the military for long. Nearly a century ago, integration of the US military preceded civilian civil rights, and so conversely a rollback there will likely precede a rollback everywhere. I see our military and our country doing those things, and I do not see an exception to the course of history. I see Kokand, in terror behind barricades; I see Austria-Hungary, lining the roads of its own farms with priests on poles; I see the Mahdiya, with warehouses of rotting food while people starve. I see countries waging war against their people, I see countries burning off the map.

I have full faith that this attempt to turn America into a narrow, ignorant, pissant little state will end in failure. Where knowledge is power, it chooses ignorance; where diversity is strength, it chooses bigotry. Few countries so openly choose to sacrifice their own well being so brazenly, because it is stupid and gets your entire country killed. It will lose. I just hope that it loses before it kills me. ~

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