Geopolitics of the Sahel

The Sahel region has been rocked by a series of coups d’etat this decade, continuing over half a century of political uncertainty across West Africa. These recent developments threaten to reshape the geopolitical landscape of the formerly French-colonized countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

All three are currently ruled by military juntas who, since seizing power, have united together as an “Alliance of Sahel States” in the face of a threat of invasion by ECOWAS,¹The Economic Community of West African States. To read more about this threat of invasion, see: Felix Onuah, “Niger coup: West African bloc activates standby force for possible intervention.” Reuters, August 11, 2023. the regional political and economic body. Alarmingly, these military juntas have also distinguished themselves as being overtly pro-Russia. For anyone who is familiar with the region’s politics and post-colonial history, the ascendancy of military rule may not necessarily seem to be anything out of the ordinary, given that West Africa has experienced 220 attempted coups d’etat²Megan Duzor and Brian Williamson, “By The Numbers: Coups in Africa.” VOA News, October 3rd, 2023.
since 1950. What is surprising, however, is this unprecedented indication of a radical regional geopolitical turn towards Moscow.

At first glance, this appears to be the ultimate act of rebellion against “Western hegemony,”³For the states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, who constitutes the “West” would principally be France and the US. a geopolitical revolt underpinned by mass sentiments of injustice and exploitation at the hands of Western powers… and only further exacerbated by the painful memory of colonization. Observers must understand that people’s parents and grandparents (including my own) were born under the dictatorial horrors of formal colonialism and were reduced to the dehumanizing status of colonized subjects. The grave injustices of this political order aren’t easily forgotten, nor any less its lingering economic legacies. Public perceptions⁴In the absence of reliable public opinion polls to measure public perception across the three Sahelian case study states, we may point towards the rising number of mass protests and demonstrations (including outside the French embassy) that have taken place in recent years. For one example, see: Thiam Ndiaga, “Hundreds join anti-France protest in Burkina Faso capital.” Reuters, January 20 2023. and anxieties around the economic legacies of colonialism in particular cannot be stressed enough: Ouagadougou, Bamako, and Niamey have all become home to grassroots opposition movements⁵For example, the M5 movement in Mali has seen anti-France chants at its demonstrations, many of them in favor of the anti-Paris military government of Colonel Assimi Goïta.
protesting against the perceived perpetual dominance of France. From Bobo Dioulasso to Ségou, ordinary people across the Sahel are laying the blame for their impoverished condition upon an inherited system of economic dependence, through which France continues to extract wealth from its former colonies. These allegations can be summarized with one word, neocolonialism – charges that have been dismissed by some in Europe as the mistaken conclusions of “Russian disinformation.”⁶John Irish, Elizabeth Pineau and Bate Felix, “France targets Russian and Wagner disinformation in Africa.” Reuters, June 21 (2023). These were indeed the effect of the June 2023 words of then-Foreign Minister of France Catherine Colonna, who claimed that such a campaign was being carried out in Francophone Africa by “Russian actors” with “state entities or entities affiliated to the Russian state.”⁷“France says uncovers major disinformation campaign waged by Russia.” France24. June 13, 2023.

Others among Europe’s political leadership, like Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, have supported these charges of neocolonialism. In a 2019 private television appearance that took place prior to her political ascendancy, she held up a photo of a child worker in a Burkinabé gold mine and claimed that the gold produced there actually funded the French economy through the Paris-controlled CFA franc “colonial money.”⁸See Sky News Australia’s YouTube broadcast of a clip from this interview – “‘Magnificent’: Meloni blasts France’s ‘exploitation’ of African countries on live TV,” 2023. Summarizing her claims: “the gold that this child goes down a tunnel to extract… mostly ends up in the coffers of the French state.” Now, we must keep in mind that Meloni,⁹Meloni was also a youth member of the Italian Social
Movement that was founded in 1946 by followers of Benito Mussolini. then just an MP but also the leader of a far-right political party, did not make these claims from a standpoint of solidarity with child laborers, but rather was driven by her own extreme views against African immigration. She named and blamed French economic extraction, carried out through neocolonial tools such as the CFA franc, as the factor that is keeping West Africa poor, driving African immigration, and therefore causing Europe’s migrant crisis. With that said, a broken clock can still be right twice a day; Meloni’s claims have since been fact-checked,¹⁰“Fact-checking Giorgia Meloni’s claim about France.” BBCNews. 02 January, 2023. and while they do not entirely hold up, an element of truth nonetheless persists in that the CFA franc currency does indeed function as a tool for upholding French economic dominance across the Sahel.

Françafrique:
A Case of French Neocolonialism

The CFA franc – the currency of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, among 11 other West African nations – was created during the period of direct colonialism, when France was still the world’s second largest empire. Somewhat reflecting its political purpose, the “CFA” in the currency’s name initially stood for “Colonies Françaises d’Afrique,” or “French Colonies of Africa,” before later being changed to its present-day designation of “Communauté Financière Africaine,” or the “African Financial Community.”¹¹It had also been known
as “Communauté française d’Afrique,” or the “French Community of Africa,” briefly during the 1950s, but was changed to
its present-day meaning at the start of the 1960s – the “decade of independence” for most WestAfrican former French colonies.
It was introduced as the legal tender for Francophone Africa and was controlled by financial and colonial officers in Paris, of course. Against the wishes of many, however, adopting the CFA franc would later essentially become an imposed condition for African colonies wishing to gain independence from France. The word “essentially” is important here because, as is generally true of neocolonialism, the coercive and unjust factor here was not formal, but rather consequential. For example, while participation in the CFA franc currency at the time of independence was formally a voluntary choice, those who refused, like Guinea, were punished severely. Ahmed Sékou Touré, Guinea’s leader at the time, criticized what he identified as the fiscal constraints imposed by the currency, instead declaring that “Guinea prefers poverty in freedom, to riches in slavery.”¹²Saliou Samb, “Guinea Marks 50 years’ independence.” Reuters,October 2, 2008.

There are a few examples of these fiscal constraints that we may consider. France had the power to unilaterally devalue the currency, controversially doing so by 50% in a 1994 move¹³The decision to devalue the CFA franc forced West African nations to make painful
public spending cuts; in Senegal, Abdou Diouf had been elected with a promise that the currency would not be devalued. When this happened anyway a year later, huge riots erupted in response. For more information on how and why France devalued the CFA franc, see: Landry Signé, “How the France-backed African CFA franc works as an enabler and barrier to development.” BROOKINGS,December 7, 2019. that plunged numerous West Africans into poverty, while French businesses enjoyed a significant boost in currency conversion. Perhaps a better example of these constraints includes the fact that, until 2019, CFA franc nations had to pool their foreign currency reserves through two African central banks, with France holding a de facto veto power¹⁴Ndongo Samba Sylla, “The CFA Franc: French Monetary Imperialism in Africa.” LSEBlogs, July 12th 2017. on the board of these African banks. These Paris-controlled or at least Paris-influenced banks then had to deposit 50% of their foreign currency reserves with the French treasury.

Effectively, this served to undermine any future plans to Africanize local businesses, banks, and other commercial enterprises that were still under French control. One example we may consider is the Orano group, which has been extracting strategically important uranium deposits for 40 years in Gabon, another former French colony, and for 50 years in Niger. Keep in mind that Niger is one of France’s largest suppliers¹⁵Raphael Parens, “Perfect Storm: Niger’s Uranium Amidst Sahelian Chaos.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, November27, 2023. of uranium, with almost 70%¹⁶“Nuclear power plants generated 68% of France’s
of France’s electricity being derived from nuclear power. A key player in the uranium sectors of Niger and Gabon, the Paris-headquartered corporation has been implicated, alongside its predecessor entities Areva, COGEMA,¹⁷Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires, or the General Nuclear Materials Company. and Framatome, in several mining catastrophes and cases of labour exploitation.¹⁸“Orano / Framatome / Areva / Cogéma Hall of Infamy,” WISE Uranium Project. Arguably, Orano’s (or rather, its predecessors’) initial foothold into the African uranium market could be traced all the way back to the CEA,¹⁹The Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA), or the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission. which was founded in 1945. In other words, I am arguing that French control over key African resources began with state-backed enterprises under colonialism²⁰An argument could be made that goes even further and locates the origin of this resource control in the period of the transatlantic slave trade, but this is a topic for another day!
– but France was not the only European power to do this in the region. The former British West African colony we know today as Ghana had for centuries been named the “Gold Coast” by British slavers and colonists – a perfect example of how entire countries were reduced to and administered around the key resource(s) to be extracted.

One way in which French colonialism differs from that of the British concerns how the former’s economic and extractive dominance was maintained. During the independence era, France imposed trade deals that gave it and its private-sector companies “exclusive or at least preferential”²¹“A post-colonial examination of the CFA Franc,” IE International Policy Review. July 2nd, 2019. rights to the resources they had long enjoyed as well as any future discoveries; this put France “in a beneficial position to help boost its economy,”²²Ibid though these preferential trade relationships have long been the subject of criticism²³Ruth Yohannes, “The End of Francafrique? French Economic and Political Strategies in Cote d’Ivoire and their Local Responses.” Seattle University, 2019 thesis submitted for International Studies. by international organizations such as the World Trade Organization. In sum, Francophone West African economies were never fully decolonized, and those who intended to pursue policies of economic decolonization would face challenges through France’s dominance over the CFA franc currency and could potentially forfeit their foreign currency reserves; this threat was not written but, rather, was implicit. It was obvious to all those concerned, having been hammered home by nefarious actions undertaken by France to uphold this regime of economically entrenched neocolonial dominance, or what François-Xavier Verschave labelled “Françafrique.”²⁴François-Xavier Verschave, “Francafrique, le crime continue” (Franceafrique, the crime continues”). Tahin Party, October1, 2000. Below the mention of Francafrique in the body of text is a picture of graffiti describing Francafrique as “le colonialisme continue,” or “colonialism continues.” Originally uploaded by Ophelia Noor on Oct. 18, 2010 to FlickR on a Creative Commons/Non-Commercial shareable license.

Returning to Ahmed Sékou Touré’s Guinea as an example of these “nefarious actions,” France reacted to his country’s rejection of the CFA franc and unequal trade agreements by immediately withdrawing all resources and personnel from the country – but they did not stop there. French colonists were ordered to oversee the destruction of as much of Guinea’s infrastructure as they could while leaving the country, damaging roads, burning stockpiles of medicine, and not even leaving behind a single lightbulb for the Guineans. They even took their pens and blank sheets of paper with them. The message was clear; this was the extreme pettiness and utter disregard for civilization that awaited any colony that dared to reject the French colonial currency and conditions for independence. This was ‘“Operation Persil”’ in action (taking inspiration from Nazi Germany’s Operation Bernhard), the punishment awaiting any nation that sought to chart its own economic path. Behaving as if they were in some sort of espionage film, French agents flooded the fledgling Guinean economy with counterfeit notes, seeking to cause economic destabilization just as Nazi Germany had attempted to when agents of the Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS forged potentially £300 million worth of fake British bank notes in 1942, intending to bring about the collapse of the British economy. France’s actions, for which even today the French government has not offered a sincere official apology, were nothing short of economic warfare.

The above is not intended to be an exhaustive exposé of Françafrique, but rather just a brief outline of the complaints raised by a growing number of people across the Sahel region. This system of economic dominance, upheld by political actions and clandestine operations, is what protestors are naming as the source of their individual and collective poverty. The military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have united through a common response against Françafrique, giving official recognition to longstanding popular criticisms. In one, two, or all three of these nations, moves have been made to restrict or revoke French resource extraction licenses, demote the official-language status of the French language, and demand – in policy as well as rhetoric – that French companies no longer enjoy the preferential business rights granted to them at or shortly after “independence.”

Opposing Françafrique is a source of legitimacy for the ruling military elites of these nations, a popular justification behind their unconstitutional seizure of power and a rationalization of their criticisms of the “ineffective” civilian elites whom they had blamed for allowing French dominance to continue. In other words, the idea here is that democratic administrations worked harder for French capital, than they did for the peoples of their nations. This partly ties into another more prominent justification employed by these juntas: that is, (false) claims that both France and the “ineffective” former civilian governments were exacerbating the Islamist insurgencies that have threatened the national security and territorial integrity of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali.

The Islamist Insurgencies

Any discussion of the rise of military juntas across the Sahel must take into consideration the Islamist insurgencies that are wreaking havoc throughout the region. Combatting an Islamist insurgency was in fact the primary justification cited by all three military rulers for their seizure of power – criticisms of French neocolonialism are secondary to this, but they have nonetheless been worth dwelling on because, I argue, the extreme poverty resulting from Françafrique created the economic conditions that have sustained these insurgencies. If extremism is to be understood as a germ, poverty is the condition that allows said germ to spread rapidly. Furthermore, these insurgencies – which should really be understood as one insurgency taking place across several borders throughout the region – can be rooted in colonial partition.

The armed forces of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali have faced violent engagements with religious extremists and armed ethnic separatists. The former seek to establish societies ruled by religious doctrines, while the latter comprise groups like the Tuaregs²⁵For more information on the Tuaregs, see the attached article from the Minority Rights Group: https://minorityrights.org/communities/tuareg/ fighting for national self-determination – which they have done consistently since colonial times. The severity of this conflict cannot be underestimated: Burkina Faso in particular has seen up to 40%²⁶“State controls just 60 percent of Burkina Faso: ECOWAS mediator.” Al-Jazeera, June 18,2022. of its territory fall under the control of non-state actors, while terror-related deaths in the Sahel have increased by 2,000% in just 15 years,²⁷Fatma Esma Arslan, “Terrorism deaths in Africa’s Sahel spiked 2,000% in 15 years: Report.” Anadolu Agency, March 22, 2023. with upwards of 30,000 deaths and millions displaced from their homes across the region. From the religious camp, the groups involved are Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine, The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and smaller jihadist groups such as Al-Mourabitoun, or the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (which was formed as an off-shoot of AQIM). Again, the seriousness of these groups and their violence should not be underestimated. Beheadings, suiciding bombings, and even attacks on buses of school children²⁸“Children among more than a dozen killed in Burkina Faso bombing, security sources say.” France24, January 4, 2020. define their modus operandi. Their intentions are clear: to establish an Islamic state, a goal that transcends borders and, therefore, has inevitably impacted all three AES countries. The map, further up this page, indicates the approximate areas of ISGS activity.

From the ethnic separatist camp, the Tuaregs are the primary actors. As a semi-nomadic people, they live all around the Sahara Desert, with sizable populations in the AES countries as well as Algeria and Libya. They are one among many African ethnic groups that were artificially partitioned at the 1884 Berlin conference between two or more empires, with this division subsequently further entrenched along the borders of modern nation-states. The Tuaregs have long sought to rectify this historic wrong by making demands and, frequently, taking up arms. One notable instance was the Kaocen anti-colonial Guerilla movement of 1916-17,²⁹Frédéric Deycard, “Political Cultures and Tuareg Mobilizations: Rebels of Niger, from Kaocen to the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice” in: Guichaoua, Y. (eds) “Understanding Collective Political Violence. Conflict, Inequality and Ethnicity.” Palgrave Macmillan, London. 2012. a Sufi-inspired, Tuareg-led anti-colonial rebellion occurring mainly in the northern parts of Niger. It is a useful example to build on, since it constitutes an intersection of ethnic separatist and religious interests, which the Sahel would again witness in Mali when some of the Islamic extremists mentioned above formed a coalition with Tuareg rebels fighting under the banner of the MNLA.³⁰Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad/National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad.

The Tuareg rebels involved in this coalition were fighters returning from the disastrous collapse of the Libyan state³¹“Ex-Gaddafi Tuareg fighters boost Mali rebels.” BBC News, October 17, 2011. following NATO’s 2011 intervention against Muammar Gaddafi’s dictatorship. Tuareg fighters returned to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger with a flood of weaponry, stoking flames and exacerbating existing ethnoreligious tensions. It is no mere coincidence that the present-day Sahel crisis is widely accepted as having really exploded in 2011 – though this is not intended to disregard any continuity and links with earlier insurgencies.³²A good and readable overview of these insurgencies can be found on the wikipedia page titled “Insurgency in the Maghreb (2002–present).” In their respective battles against the regional insurgencies, the military rulers of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger enjoy the opportunity to coordinate their military operations through the AES, initially a mutual defense pact against the threat of an ECOWAS invasion. However – and this is where the insights of the previous section on Françafrique become important once more – the anti-(neo)colonial populism that has been capitalized on by the AES military rulers as a means of legitimizing their rule, has devolved into a vulgar campist world outlook. Junta-supporters across all three Sahelian nations have been seen waving Russian flags, swapping the vertical blue-white-red of France for the horizontal white-blue-red of Russia. France has been blamed for the twin evils of neocolonialism and the violent insurgencies, with some social media users claiming that insurgents are being freed by France, ostensibly to undermine the juntas and, through the perpetuation of the violence, to justify continued French presence – and with it, French hegemony.

It is on this precise topic that I must concede to French and other Western politicians that Russia has, in fact, launched a disinformation campaign targeting Africa. French forces fighting under the now discontinued Sahelian counterinsurgency Operation Barkhane have assassinated key targets, including the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb leader,³³John Campbell, “French-Led Decapitation Strike on AQIM in Mali.” Council on Foreign Relations, June 9, 2020. and killed thousands of extremist fighters. The social media-based³⁴“Mapping a Surge of Disinformation in Africa.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, March 13, 2024. sentiments against France’s presence in the Sahel have failed to appreciate these strategic victories. In my view, it is entirely plausible that “Russian actors” with “state entities or entities affiliated to the Russian state” are exploiting very real and economically justified grievances against French hegemony and redirecting them towards a campist support for Russia as a counter-hegemonic power. What is quite surprising is that this unconditional support for Russia disregards the well documented atrocities being committed across the Sahel by Russian private mercenaries – namely the erstwhile “Wagner Group,” now renamed the “African Corps.” One notable atrocity was the 2022 Moura massacre,³⁵“Mali: Massacre by Army, Foreign Soldiers.” Human Rights Watch, April 5, 2022. which saw “summary executions, rape and torture”³⁶“Moura: Over 500 killed by Malian troops, foreign military personnel in 2022 operation.” UN News, May 12, 2023. of Malian civilians committed by white men who spoke an “unknown language.”³⁷Note that as citizens of a formerly French-colonized nation, the villagers would not have been likely to recognize spoken Russian. This has long been confirmed as having been perpetrated by Russian forces alongside the Malian military, but consider my shock when an acquaintance of mine insisted that it must have been French troops disguising themselves with Russian accents! This is the irrational absurdity that is becoming dominant among legitimate anti-(neo)colonial social media discourses.

Russian mercenaries are now active in all nations of the AES, taking over the military and economic functions that were once the domain of France. An additional concern arises through the fact that the mere presence of Russian soldiers has predictably turned the Sahel region into a key battleground of the New Cold War between the United States of America and Russia. Recent reports have exposed Ukraine’s support for some of the rebel groups³⁸“West African juntas write to UN over Ukraine’s alleged rebel support,” Reuters. August 21, 2024. outlined above, indicating the opening of a “Sahelian Front” in the Russia-Ukraine War.³⁹The recent electoral victory of Donald Trump may end up calming this potential opening of a new front in the Russia-Ukraine war – having told Vladimir Putin not to escalate the war as well as claiming that he could end the conflict in a day. Only time will tell if there are truths to these claims. To better illustrate how the factors of French neocolonialism and Islamist insurgencies have resulted in these geopolitical developments, I will now provide a case study analysis of Burkina Faso – an outline of the country’s political and economic past offers historical substantiation for the regional trends that I have identified so far.

Case Study: Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso has experienced two coups d’état since 2020. The first coup took place on January 23rd and 24th, 2022, under the leadership of Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba,⁴⁰Lieutenant Colonel Damiba was notably trained in Paris alongside Mamady Doumbouya, the military officer who had seized power in Guinea in 2021. Both men also received training from the United States. who overthrew his country’s democratically elected administration, citing its inability to curb⁴¹“Burkina Faso coup leader Damiba sworn in as president.” Reuters, February 17, 2022. the Islamist insurgency to the north of the country. Damiba was not acting as an individual, but rather at the helm of the military’s frustrations with President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. Notably, among other perceived strategic errors, Kaboré refused the military’s requests to hire Russian mercenaries to fight against the spread of jihadist extremism. The hardened Wagner Group have been on the frontline of Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, and so were no strangers to the challenges of warfare. They had similarly been hired in the Central African Republic to fight an Islamic extremist insurgency in the north of that country, achieving remarkable results – but at the terrible cost of torturing innocent civilians,⁴²A range of other human rights abuses at the hands of Russia-linked forces have taken place in the Central African Republic. An example includes an incident in which apparent Russian-speaking forces killed at least 12 unarmed men near the town of Bossangoa. For more information, see: “Central African Republic: Abuses by Russia-Linked Forces.” Human Rights Watch, May 3, 2022. aimed at extracting strategic information⁴³In the above HRW source, five men alleged that they were tortured by “either Russia-linked forces, or national army soldiers following orders given by Russia-linked forces who were there beat them to obtain information or to force them to falsely admit that they were members of a former Seleka coalition.” on the whereabouts of insurgents and their weaponry. Predictably, former President Kaboré displayed a wise caution towards the prospect of hiring these ruthless fighters, who have since committed similar atrocities in Ukraine.⁴⁴Veronika Melkozerova, “We killed Ukrainian children, ex-Wagner soldiers say in apparent confession.” Politico, April 18, 2023. His hesitation, however, added to the increasingly popular disapproval of his administration that led eventually to his ouster.

Kaboré was supposed to have been a figure of great hope for the future of Burkinabè democracy. He had been elected in November 2015 during the first set of elections to take place following the fall of long-time dictator Blaise Compaoré, who ruled from 1987 to 2014 – a man who had come to power by murdering his friend and colleague, the famous socialist and anti-colonial leader Thomas Sankara. Compaoré had allegedly seized power with the support of French and US intelligence services, and later employed Kaboré as his Prime Minister (1994-1996) and as a long-serving senior member of his government-party. Despite this affiliation, Kaboré would eventually turn against his patron. He founded an opposition party to challenge Compaoré’s controversial attempt to change the constitution and extend the presidential term limit, the unwise move that resulted in his downfall following the 2014 Burkina Faso uprising against his dictatorship. Though Compaoré had failed in his effort to extend his illiberal grip on power, he had nonetheless succeeded in absolutely bankrupting the nation. At the end of his 27-year-long rule, Burkina Faso had become one of the poorest nations in Africa, with almost half of the country living under the poverty line. Compaoré’s regime has been held up as a textbook example of “Françafrique” – a neocolonial state of affairs servicing French business, cultural, and political interests. In exchange for Compaoré’s decades of loyalty, France consistently refused to accept complaints of human rights violations⁴⁵“French courts refuse to accept a complaint against the president of Burkina Faso.” RSF (Reports Without Borders). committed by his regime. Kaboré was expected to reorient the country’s economic policy back towards the legacy of Sankara, who had prioritized development and made a personal crusade out of eliminating poverty and achieving self-reliance as a means of economic decolonization. Indeed, it was Sankara who had renamed the country to Burkina Faso in 1984, combining the local words of “Burkina” (upright) from Mooré and “Faso” (land) from Dioula, resulting in Burkina Faso, or “The Land of the Upright Men.” This new name would mark a powerful departure from the nation’s former name of the colonial period, The Republic of “Haute Volta” – meaning “Upper Volta” (the Volta River begins in and runs through Burkina Faso and terminates in Ghana). Sankara’s political and economic ideals had always remained popular in the Sahelian state, but Kaboré failed to capitalize on this with any meaningful change, resulting in a rising tide of dissatisfaction around the nation. Ordinary people felt that they were promised economic development and prosperity as the fruits of their successful popular effort to remove the Compaoré regime, but these promises were felt to have been unfulfilled. The proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back was the national security danger posed by the growing Islamist insurgency to the north of the country, causing thousands to begin protesting⁴⁶Henry Wilkins, “Thousands in Burkina Faso Call For President’s Resignation.” VOA News, November 27, 2021. against the Kaboré government.

With the help of French military support, Compaoré had long kept the northern insurgency in check;⁴⁷Regionally, Compaoré was seen as a “peacemaker” and was “long suspected of having a pact with Malian rebels whereby he allowed them safe haven in Burkina Faso in exchange for non-aggression – but that came to an end when he left power.” the situation began to deteriorate post-2011 and spiraled especially out of control under Kaboré. The conflict specifically in Burkina Faso (post-Compaoré) has displaced 1.4 million people and sent shockwaves around the country, through shootings and car bombings targeting schools, hotels, and cafés. Outside of urban areas, hundreds of men, women, and children have been killed in raids targeting local markets and rural villages. The nation hit a new low in November 2021, when a jihadist assault on a security outpost claimed the lives of 49 soldiers near the northern town of Inata. These soldiers were already demoralized, having reportedly been underpaid and undersupplied by the Kaboré government to the point of running out of food and being forced to hunt nearby animals for sustenance. Resentment among the civilian population is always a political danger – but in a region that has experienced several attempted coups this century, there’s nothing riskier than allowing resentment to build up among the military. Weeks after the Inata massacre, Kaboré was removed from power by Lieutenant Colonel Damiba. Damiba blamed Kaboré⁴⁸“Burkina Faso coup: New leader Damiba gives first speech.” BBC News, January 28, 2022. for failing to contain the rising tide of violence by Islamist militants; there is no doubt that Kaboré’s refusal to hire Wagner Group mercenaries had made him unpopular among military circles, a factor leading to his overthrow. Damiba sought not to repeat Kaboré’s errors and tried to retain the support of the military, but he also had to play a balancing game in appeasing ECOWAS concerns⁴⁹The regional bloc had suspended Burkina Faso’s membership following the coup by promising to return to civilian rule “when conditions are right.”⁵⁰Edward Mcallister and Thiam Ndiaga, “Burkina Faso will return to constitutional order when conditions are right, military leader says.” Reuters,January 28, 2022. However, these conditions would only further deteriorate during Damiba’s nine months at the helm of a nation in crisis.

What followed was a further entrenchment of military rule, with Captain Ibrahim Traoré swiftly intervening against Damiba in a September 2022 counter-coup d’etat, supported by the “Cobra” elite special forces who were fighting at the frontlines of the insurgency. This was also a unit that Traoré himself had previously led in the northern region of Kaya.⁵¹“Burkina Faso: Military officers remove President Damiba in a coup.” Al-Jazeera, September 13, 2022. The Junior officers of this unit had grown dissatisfied⁵²“Burkina Junta Chief Urges Putschists to ‘Come to Their Senses’.” Agence France-Presse, cited in VOA News, October 2, 2022. with Damiba’s leadership, as he had failed to keep his promise to control the security situation. After seizing power, Traoré ordered a “general mobilization”⁵³“‘General mobilisation’ declared in Burkina Fasoafter series of terrorist attacks.” France24, April 14, 2023. of the entire population in a radical effort to turn the tide of the debilitating insurgency. For some, he has revived the image and character of Thomas Sankara, who also seized power at the age of 33-34. Traoré appointed a Pan-African ally of Sankara, Apollinaire Joachim Kyélem de Tambèla, as his Prime Minister – whose first steps included reducing the salaries of government ministers. Kyélem de Tambèla declared, to the adoration of many, that “I have already said that Burkina Faso cannot be developed outside the path set by Thomas Sankara.” This Sankarist line, boldly taken by Captain Traoré, marks an ideological departure from the neocolonial “Françafrique” path of extreme poverty and economic dependence that has characterized Compaoré’s rule. Traoré has set a clear course away from France – deporting French journalists,⁵⁴“Burkina Faso expels correspondents from French newspapers.” BBC News, April 2, 2023. prohibiting French state-owned media channels,⁵⁵“Burkina Faso suspends French international station TV5 for six months.” France24, June 19, 2024. terminating military accords⁵⁶Thiam Ndiaga, “Burkina Faso ends French military accord, says it will defend itself.” Reuters, January 23, 2023. signed with Paris and ordering the expulsion of French diplomats⁵⁷“Burkina Faso’s pro-Russia junta expels French diplomats.” BBC News, April 18, 2024. from the country. Evidently, and as was also the case with Sankara⁵⁸Sankara launched a systematic attack on trade unions and banned any independent press outlet. This is a big and controversial topic that really deserves its own focus, as there are some nuances that cannot be properly explored here. and his similarly strained relationship with the former colonial power, Traoré’s rule has already delivered authoritarian overtures and illiberal policies that should concern us all. Traoré has unilaterally extended his military rule by 5 years in a process that was boycotted by the nation’s political parties.⁵⁹“Burkina Faso extends military rule by five years.” Al-Jazeera, May 26, 2024. Bizarrely, his regime has also announced a ban on homosexuality⁶⁰Richard Kagoe, “Burkina Faso’s military junta to ban homosexual acts.” BBC News, July 11, 2024. in the country – one would think that a nation embroiled in such a disastrous war of existence would have bigger fish to fry. Traoré’s foreign policy is equally a cause for concern: his Prime Minister visited Moscow, despite the international backlash this would cause following Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Traoré himself has hailed Russia as a “strategic ally”⁶¹“Interim Burkina Faso president hails Russia as ‘strategic ally’.” Al-Jazeera, May 5, 2023. to the nation, with Moscow signing a deal with Burkina Faso to build a nuclear power plant⁶²Gloria Aradi, “Russia to build nuclear plant to meet Burkina Faso’s energy needs.” BBC News, October 13, 2023. in the country – a victory in Traoré’s broader aim to build up the nation’s infrastructure and move away from (neo)colonial economic dependency. In this sense, despite his authoritarian policies, Traoré does indeed seem to be focused on meeting the material needs of Burkinabés and developing the productive capacities of the country. Additionally, Russia has agreed to provide Burkina Faso (as well as Mali and Niger) with satellites.⁶³Paul Njie, “Russia in satellite deal with West African military governments.” BBC News, September 24, 2024.

But what does Russia get out of this?

While Traoré’s government has announced plans to withdraw some foreign mining permits⁶⁴“Gold mining companies scramble for answers after Burkina Faso leaders announce plan to withdraw some foreign mining permits.” The Morning Star, October 7, 2024). – possibly impacting Western-owned companies Orezone Gold Corporation, Endeavour Mining, and West African Resources Limited – just months earlier, Burkina Faso granted a mining license⁶⁵“Burkina Faso grants permit for new gold mine.” AfricaNews, August 13, 2024. to a Russian company, Norgold, and may potentially provide the company with tax breaks and other incentives.⁶⁶“Burkina Faso promises to support Russian gold mining company Nordgold — envoy.” TASS – Russian News Agency, July 24, 2024. This would be nothing new for Norgold, which has long operated mines in the country and avoided paying taxes under the Compaoré regime, to the tune of approximately $320 million.⁶⁷Nick Mathiason, “Low tax guaranteed: how a Russian mining giant has saved $16.5m in Burkina Faso – one of the world’s poorest countries.” Finance Uncovered, August 27 (2018). Tax avoidance by foreign corporations exploiting African resources is as much a Western affair as it is Russian, but what is concerning here is that Traoré is taking steps against Western commercial entities, while seemingly enabling Russian capital to exploit his nation’s resource wealth in the same manner. Norgold’s investments in Burkina Faso are now said to exceed $1.5 billion.⁶⁸“What is known about relations between Russia and Burkina Faso.” TASS – Russian News Agency, June 5, 2024. This follows the acquisition by Russia of Mali’s Intahaka gold mine, the largest in the north of that AES country. Taken together, this signals a serious regional shift in economic dependency from West to East.

Returning again to the question of how Russia benefits from this regional geopolitical realignment, in addition to these immediate financial gains, we should keep in mind that these valuable gold deposits offer Russia strategically important access to foreign exchange, a fact of global geopolitical significance given the current sanctions in place against Putin’s regime. We must also consider if Russian corporations like Norgold, as well as the Wagner Group, are taking actions to prevent child labor – or “Orpaillage,” as it is known locally⁶⁹“Child labour in gold mining: The problem,” International Labour Organization. – and the conditions of modern slavery that are endemic to Burkina Faso’s mining industry. It is estimated that between “30 and 50% of the workers on small-scale mines are children,”⁷⁰Marc Sollinger, “Children Mining for Gold in Burkina Faso.” PBS News Hour Classroom, November, 2023. a shocking and sad state of affairs, but nothing new. Western companies have long benefited from these very same injustices, doing very little over the many decades they have had to make meaningful changes to the industry. Western states have failed to enact ethical supply chain legislation to prohibit the (indirect) sourcing of child-mined products – and even when, occasionally, steps have been taken, they have been insufficient. For example, when the US introduced a ban on government agencies and contractors sourcing materials from child labor, it refused to extend the policy to private dealers.⁷¹Larry C. Price, “Burkina Faso: Childhoods Lost in the Gold Mines.” The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 28, 2013. The fact of the matter, however, is that while the West remains far from a principled stand on child labor in the Sahel, Russia has signaled zero intention whatsoever to introduce ethical mining legislation or to prohibit its private and commercial entities from benefiting from this type of extreme labor exploitation. It is very hard to imagine that the Wagner Private Military Company will suddenly become an ethical, socially conscious fairtrade employer.

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A concluding thought on these developments concerns what I label the “proxification” of the region. There is an ever-pressing and very real fear that by aligning so strongly with Putin, Burkina Faso will become “proxified” in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. As mentioned briefly, Traoré’s government, alongside the AES military rulers of Niger and Mali, has written to the UN Security Council demanding that they “take appropriate measures”⁷²James Tasamba, “Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger accuse Ukraine of supporting terrorism in Sahel.” Anadolu Agency. August 21, 2024. against Ukraine for Kyiv’s transfer of military intelligence to Tuareg rebels, who then used this knowledge to launch an assault on Malian soldiers in the Algerian-border village of Tinzawaten. Ukraine’s violation of Malian sovereignty as a means of undermining Russian mercenaries in the Sahel is the shocking, if not quite unpredictable, geopolitical consequence of Russia’s presence in the region. Having foreign powers fighting foreign wars on your land is a recipe for disaster – just ask Angola, Congo, Nicaragua, and the many other countries that have suffered devastating wars as a result of extraterritorial interests. Development along “the path set by Thomas Sankara” absolutely cannot be attained by becoming a battleground for larger geopolitical rivalries.

Finally, while the deals signed with Russia are promising (and steps towards economic development should always be celebrated), we must sincerely ask: at what cost? Military juntas – and the inevitable authoritarian acts and human rights violations that accompany them – are not the sole path for West Africans who wish to oppose (neo)colonial dominance and develop the region.

In Senegal, the democratic and people-led PASTEF movement has just won a historic electoral victory, showing us that it is entirely possible for a Sahelian state to oppose neocolonialism constitutionally, without Russia, and in a manner that is wholly accountable to ordinary citizens. It must, however, be noted that Senegal, situated at the westernmost edge of the Sahel, has fortunately been shielded from much of the violence and conflict that is harming its neighbors. The nation has also never experienced a single coup d’etat since its independence – contrary to the regional trend. With that said, Senegal has nonetheless struggled with a separatist conflict⁷³Eromo Egbejule, “Senegal’s troubled Casamance region hopes for peace with rise of local boy to PM.” The Guardian, August 28, 2024. in the southern Casamance region, and the government considers itself a potential target of the broader jihadist extremism that has engulfed the Sahel region. Only time will tell whether or not PASTEF can deliver on its promise to chart a brave new political and economic course for the country…but if successful, it should remind us always to collectively seek the best possible path towards building the societies that we deserve. ~